Operation Olive Leaves

Operation Olive Leaves
Part of the Retribution operations

Ariel Sharon (left), overall commander of Operation Olive Leaves, consults with Aharon Davidi (center), commander of the 771 Reserve Paratroop Battalion and Company Commander Yitzchak Ben Menachem (right), who was killed during the assault.
Date December 10–11, 1955
Location North-Eastern shoreline of the Sea of Galilee (Kinneret)
Result Israeli victory
Belligerents
Israel  Syria
Commanders and leaders
Ariel Sharon
Rafael Eitan
Aharon Davidi
Meir Har-Zion
Yitzchack Ben Menachem
Casualties and losses
6 killed 54 killed
30 captured

Operation Olive Leaves (Hebrew: מבצע עלי זיתAlei Zayit) also known as Operation Kinneret (the Israeli name for the Sea of Galilee) was an Israeli reprisal operation undertaken on December 10–11, 1955 against fortified Syrian emplacements near the north-eastern shores of the Sea of Galilee. The raid was prompted by repeated Syrian attacks on Israeli fishing in the Sea of Galilee.[1][2] The successful operation resulted in the destruction of the Syrian emplacements. The Syrians also sustained fifty-four killed in action. Another thirty were taken prisoner. There were six IDF fatalities.[3]

Contents

Background

Following the Arab-Israeli war of 1948, Syria refused to sign a peace treaty with Israel but did agree to stipulate to an armistice.[4] The armistice arrangement, signed on July 20, 1949[5] provided for the establishment of demilitarized zones (DZ) on the border between Israel and Syria. Disputes soon arose concerning sovereignty over the DZs leading to periodic border clashes and constant border tensions.[6] Despite the fact that the international border passed inland from the east bank of the Sea of Galilee[6] thus placing the entire sea and surrounding shoreline under Israeli sovereignty, Syrian gunners continued to harass Israeli fishermen. Moreover, there were a number of border transgressions involving Syrian fishermen and farmers, who, under the protection of Syrian guns, continued utilize the sea for fishing and irrigation.[6] Israeli patrol vessels sent to enforce Israeli sovereignty rights were frequently fired upon from Syrian emplacements east of the shoreline.

The battle

Faced with repeated Syrian border transgressions, the Israelis decided that a reprisal was necessary and a large-scale operation was authorized by Defense Minister David Ben Gurion. Prime Minister Moshe Sharett was in the United States at the time and so Ben Gurion was also acting as Prime Minister in his absence.[7] The operation would be Israel’s response to an “extended period of Syrian provocative actions and extended shootings.”[8] The operational objectives of the mission were to strike at the Syrians, destroy military emplacements on the shoreline and take prisoners. These were to be exchanged for four Israelis held captive by Syria under brutal and inhumane conditions.[9][10] Ariel Sharon was given overall command of the operation.[11] On the night of 11–12 December 1955 elements of the 890th Paratroop Battalion, augmented by units of Aharon Davidi’s 771 Reserve Paratroop Battalion as well as units from the Nahal and Givati Brigades commenced their attack. The complex operation involved a two-column attack from the north and south as well as amphibious assaults.[12] The combined force stuck Syrian emplacements all along the Kinneret’s northeastern shoreline north of Kibbutz Ein Gev until the Jordan River estuary. The attack was successful and all the Syrian emplacements were destroyed. The Syrians suffered fifty-four killed in action and another thirty Syrian soldiers were taken prisoner. There were six Israeli fatalities. Among these was Company Commander Yitzchak Ben Menachem, a highly regarded soldier and hero of Israel's War of Independence[13] who was killed by a Syrian hand grenade while attacking Syrian positions near Akib.[14] His death notwithstanding, the mission was regarded as an unmitigated success. Political fallout generated by the operation would later prompt Ben Gurion to comment, somewhat sarcastically, that it may have been “too successful.”[15]

Aftermath

Though militarily successful, political fallout from the operation was immediate. It drew a United Nations rebuke[16] and Prime Minister Moshe Sharett bitterly complained that Ben Gurion exceeded his authority when he failed to consult the Cabinet and seek a vote on the matter.[17] Nonetheless, the operation was a tactical success and achieved two important objectives. First, it impressed upon the Syrians the might which Israel could bring to bear if provoked. Indeed, it has been suggested that Syria’s failure to act militarily on behalf of its Egyptian ally during Israel’s Operation Kadesh was a consequence of Operation Olive Leaves.[12] Second, Israel’s capture of numerous Syrian soldiers during the raid helped facilitate the release of its four captives held by Syria. On March 29, 1956 a prisoner exchange was effectuated and the four were returned to Israel after enduring fifteen months of captivity in Syria.[18][9]

References

  1. ^ Encyclopedia Judaica, Vol 9 Macmillan 1971, p386
  2. ^ "The Failure of the Armistice". IMFA. http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israels+Foreign+Relations+since+1947/1947-1974/THE+FAILURE+OF+THE+ARMISTICE.htm. 
  3. ^ Spencer Tucker, The encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli conflict, ABC-CLIO, (2008) p. 232
  4. ^ P.R. Kumaraswamy, The A to Z of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Scarcrow Press, Inc. (2006) p. 30
  5. ^ Walter Eytan, The First Ten Years, Simon & Schuster (1958), p.44
  6. ^ a b c "Arab-Israeli wars: 60 years of conflict". ABC-CLIO History and the Headlines. http://www.historyandtheheadlines.abc-clio.com/ContentPages/ContentPage.aspx?entryId=1281370&currentSection=1271019&productid=16. 
  7. ^ David Vital, Abraham Ben-Zvi, Aaron S. Klieman Global Politics: essays in honor of David Vital (Frank Cass, 2001) p. 182
  8. ^ Ze’evi Derori, Israel's reprisal policy, 1953–1956: the dynamics of military retaliation, Frank Cass (2005), p. 157
  9. ^ a b Ephraim Kahana, Historical dictionary of Israeli intelligence, (Scarecrow 2006) pp.118–119
  10. ^ Michael Bar-Zohar, Lionhearts, Heroes of Israel, Warner Books, 1998, p. 187
  11. ^ Derori (2005) , p.159
  12. ^ a b P.R. Kumaraswamy, The A to Z of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Scarcrow Press, Inc. (2006) p.146
  13. ^ paratroopers, Jewish Virtual Library
  14. ^ Derori (2005), p. 163
  15. ^ David Vital, Abraham Ben-Zvi, Aaron S. Klieman Global Politics: essays in honor of David Vital (Frank Cass, 2001) p. 182
  16. ^ Mordechai Naor, The Twentieth Century In Eretz Israel, Konemann (1996) p.323
  17. ^ Vital (2001), p 182
  18. ^ Naor, p.328